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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1718, Robert Maynard sailed into Hampton Roads, Virginia with the
severed head of Captain Edward Teach, better known as the legendary
Blackbeard, proudly displayed on the bowsprit of his vessel.1 Almost three
hundred years later, six suspected Somali pirates stood for trial in a U.S.
district court in Norfolk, Virginia, not far from Hampton Roads.2 The USS
Ashland found the suspects on April 10, 2010, floating in a small boat in the
Gulf of Aden with AK-47 style firearms, apparently lying in wait for passing
ships.3 Though these men were clearly not fishing,4 the judge dropped the
piracy charges on August 17, 2010, finding that “the Government . . . failed
to establish that any unauthorized acts of violence or aggression committed
on the high seas constitutes piracy” under U.S. or international law.5 On one
hand, the due process enjoyed by these suspected pirates illustrates the
advancements made in criminal justice since the days of Blackbeard.6 On
the other hand, the case underscores one of the greatest challenges faced in
the fight against modern maritime piracy—how to effectively and fairly
prosecute a Somali pirate.7
With the recent resurgence in piratical activities off the eastern coast of
Africa,8 finding an answer to this question remains crucial. Despite
heightened attention from the international community, efforts to quell the

1

Keith Johnson, Who’s a Pirate? In Court, A Duel Over Definitions, WALL ST. J., Aug.
20, 2010, at W1.
2
United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374
(4th Cir. 2012) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges of piracy).
3
Id. at 556–57.
4
Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Pirates in National Courts: US v Said and Piracy Under
US Law, EJIL: TALK! (Aug 23, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/prosecuting-pirates-in-nationalcourts-us-v-said-and-piracy-under-us-law/ (criticizing the district court’s ruling in Said).
5
Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
6
Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates
and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 256–57 (2010).
7
See id. at 256–74 (explaining the difficulties of effectively prosecuting pirates); James
Thuo Gathii, The Use of Force, Freedom of Commerce, and Double Standards in Prosecuting
Pirates in Kenya, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1343 (2010) (questioning whether suspected
pirates receive adequate rights as defendants in Kenyan prosecutions).
8
See INT’L MAR. ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT – 2011, para. 6, (2012) [hereinafter IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT],
available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/PiracyReports/180_
Annual2011.pdf (citing a worldwide increase of piratical acts from 489 in 2010 to 544 in
2011, while the number of reported piratical acts near East Africa jumped from 172 in 2010 to
233 in 2011, an increase of approximately 23%); Raymond Gilpin, Ctr. for Sustainable
Econs., Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Working Paper, 2009),
available at http://www.usip.org/publications/counting-the-costs-somali-piracy.
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rise in piracy have achieved only qualified success.9 By increasing the multinational naval presence in the region, for example, the rate of successful
pirate attacks declined from 63% in 2007, to 21% in 2009.10 Thus far,
however, the world’s naval forces have failed to pursue or apprehend those
responsible for piratical activities, “which may not be sufficient to deter
piracy motivated by outsized financial gains.”11 Arguably, by only
interrupting the attacks and allowing the criminals to go unpunished, pirates
are not deterred from committing acts of piracy; they are merely interrupted
and delayed.12 In fact, the increase in the frequency of attacks in the region
continues, in spite of the decrease in successful attacks.13 A new approach
that includes apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration must be
implemented to meaningfully deter acts of piracy while preserving some
form of due process.
The difficulties of designing and implementing such a plan, however,
continue to frustrate the international community.14 The United Nations
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) assigns universal jurisdiction
to the crime of piracy.15 Universal jurisdiction “allows States to arrest
pirates, seize their ships and cargo, and bring them to trial in the State’s
domestic judicial system.”16 Despite this broad grant of jurisdictional
9
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further
the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, Including, in Particular, Options for Creating
Special Domestic Chambers Possibly with International Components, a Regional Tribunal or
an International Tribunal and Corresponding Imprisonment Arrangements, Taking into
Account the Work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Existing
Practice in Establishing International and Mixed Tribunals, and the Time and Resources
Necessary to Achieve and Sustain Substantive Results, para. 8, U.N. Doc S/2010/394 (July 26,
2010) [hereinafter 2010 UN Report].
10
Id.
11
Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
12
See IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 6 (noting an increase in piratical
activity in East Africa and increasing activity in the Arabian Sea resulting from Somali
pirates’ deployment of motherships).
13
According to the statistics quoted above, the success rate of piracy fell 42% between
2007 and 2009. 2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 8. According to the IMO 2011 Piracy
Report, however, although the success rate continued to decline, the number of piratical
attacks in the region actually increased by over 20%. See IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra
note 8, para. 6.
14
See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 449–51 (2010) (examining the extreme
difficulty of apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating pirates through empirical study).
15
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100–107, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
16
José Luis Jesus, Foreword, Troubled Waters: Combating Maritime Piracy with the Rule

718

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:715

authority, UNCLOS does not require any state to actually take judicial
action.17 Therefore, the decision to try piracy is left entirely to the arresting
state.18 As a result of this legal structure and the difficulties involved in
trying pirates, which will be discussed in greater detail below, many
countries exercise a catch and release policy, where pirates are simply let go
rather than apprehended for trial.19 Even countries that choose to apprehend
and prosecute suspected pirates, such as the United States, France, and the
Netherlands, face complex legal and administrative challenges that make
prosecution difficult, if not impossible.20
The multinational naval forces patrolling near Somalia can now send
captured pirates to Somalia’s neighbors to stand trial.21 Reports of
procedural abuse, however, lead observers to question whether these trials
are fair and in accordance with international law.22 Further, the expense of
prosecuting Somali pirates weighs heavily on neighboring countries.23
As these problems illustrate, the current state-centric framework is
unsustainable. It creates a disjointed approach that fails to provide
meaningful deterrence, and therefore fails to solve the problem. To reverse
this trend, the international community must better facilitate the
apprehension, trial, and incarceration of pirates in accordance with
recognized international principles of fairness and criminal justice.24 The
of Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2010) (emphasis added).
17
Id.
18
See id. (noting that some countries lack an adequate penal code to successfully prosecute
pirates, while others simply choose to avoid the complicated political problems associated
with trying foreign nationals in domestic courts).
19
See Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 59 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 141, 141 (2010) (describing catch and release maneuvers used against Somali
pirates and the inconsistent effects of the strategy); Kathryn Westcott, Pirates in the Dock,
BBC NEWS (May 21, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8059345.stm (explaining that a
Portuguese naval ship released suspected pirates after confiscating their weapons).
20
Westcott, supra note 19.
21
See Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global
Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1477–80, 1486 (2010) (providing examples of regional
agreements among African, Asian, and Western countries for prosecuting pirates, and
explaining an attempt by the United Kingdom and Kenya to use a similar system in Somalipiracy trials).
22
See Gathii, supra note 7, at 1343–45 (explaining the unlawful waiting period suspected
pirates experience between being arrested and charged with a crime in Kenya).
23
Kevin J. Kelly, U.S. Seeks to Boost Ties with Breakaway Regions, DAILY NATION (Sept. 25,
2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/US-seeks-to-boost-ties-with-breakaway-Somalia-re
gions-/-/1068/1018158/-/mwdfn5z/-/index.html (reporting that the United States has requested
Japan’s assistance in helping East African nations defer piracy related costs).
24
See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 11, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A III (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the
right to be presumed innocent . . . in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
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efforts taken to lower the pirates’ rate of success are encouraging. The
growing number of attacks, however, will continue to drain resources until
the international community takes steps to bring these criminals to justice.
Moreover, on the rare occasion when a state actually decides to try a pirate
under its own, unique judicial system, problems of cohesion and consistency
arise.25 Thus, this approach frustrates the ultimate goal of fairly and
effectively handling piracy. Universal jurisdiction should entail some degree
of universal rules of process. Therefore, the international approach to piracy
must be modified to enable vigorous prosecution of these criminals. To
achieve this goal, many scholars argue for including piracy within the
jurisdiction of existing international courts, such as the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, which currently has no jurisdiction to hear criminal
trials.26 While this option is attractive, it may be impracticable in the
immediate future since multilateral treaties can take years to enact or
amend.27 As a long-term solution, the United Nations should modify one of
these international bodies to accommodate piracy. To provide the necessary
immediate relief, however, a temporary regional tribunal should be adopted.
Part II of this Note explores the rise of Somali piracy and the legal tools
currently in place to apprehend and prosecute pirates. Part III exposes the
many flaws inherent in this legal framework in an effort to understand why
nations often choose not to prosecute apprehended Somali pirates. Part IV
analyzes current state practice once a pirate is actually brought to court.
Part IV ultimately concludes that the current legal framework is ineffective,
and that an ad hoc criminal tribunal dedicated to piracy is necessary to
remedy the situation in Somalia.

necessary for his defence.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(3),
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be
brought promptly before a judge . . . and shall be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or
to release.”).
25
Jesus, supra note 16 (suggesting that the purely jurisdictional framework of international
law does not produce a reliable approach).
26
See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 223–31
(2010); Craig Thedwall, Note, Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International
Court for Piracy, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 501 (2010) (proposing that jurisdiction to hear piracy
cases be given to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea).
27
See Fernando Peinado Alcaraz, Chasing Pirates Is All Very Well—But Who Is Going to
Lock Them Up?, EL PAÍS, Aug. 17, 2009, at 4, available at http://fernandopeinadoalcaraz.files.
wordpress.com/2011/09/somalia1.pdf (relating the difficulty involved with ratifying the Rome
Statute with any potential multilateral treaties regarding piracy).
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II. BACKGROUND OF PIRACY AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
PIRACY LAW
A. The Rise of Piracy in Somalia
Piracy is one of the world’s oldest crimes.28 The Romans confronted the
unique challenges of piracy by famously calling the ocean’s thieves “hostis
humani generis,” or enemy of all mankind, arguably establishing the world’s
first doctrine of universal jurisdiction.29 Despite incredible evolution in
technology, law enforcement, and international legal theory over the last two
millennia, groups of individuals continue to exploit the high seas and engage
in acts of piracy.30 Moreover, in recent years, the number of attacks appears
to have grown.31 Between 2000 and 2006, approximately 2,400 reports of
piracy were received, roughly doubling the previous six-year total.32 On
March 19, 2012, the IMO reported that acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships rose 11% over 2010.33 Some analysts even believe these
statistics underestimate the actual number of pirate attacks, as shipping
companies fear reporting incidents will result in increased insurance
premiums and drawn-out investigations.34
Most of this growth can be traced to the incredible surge of piratical
activity off the coast of Somalia.35 The region accounts for over half of the
world’s reported acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.36 Somali pirates
operate out of numerous small camps dotting the beaches of the expansive
Somali coast.37 They use small, fast skiffs to prey upon slow-traveling cargo
ships,38 and are becoming increasingly sophisticated, using larger “mother
ships” to extend the range of their operations farther out to sea.39 When
28

Dutton, supra note 26, at 203.
Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 301–02 (2006).
30
IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, at annexes 1–5 (providing a comprehensive
compilation of all reported acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea in 2011).
31
Michael Gagain, Current Development, Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy
and Developing States: Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
169, 170 (2010).
32
Id.
33
IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 5.
34
See, e.g., Gagain, supra note 31, at 170 (noting that Australian officials believe the actual
figure to be 2,000% higher).
35
IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 6.
36
Id. (reporting that East Africa accounted for 223 of the 544 acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships in 2011).
37
2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 7.
38
Gilpin, supra note 8, at 8.
39
2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 7.
29
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successful, Somali pirates hijack a ship, guide her to one of several camps
along Somalia’s eastern shore, and demand a ransom for the crew and
cargo.40
Disruption of the global supply chain by Somali pirates causes an
economic ripple effect throughout the international community.41 For
example, insurance rates per voyage for ships traveling through the region
escalated to around $20,000 in 2009, forty times the 2008 rate of $500.42
Companies that reroute ships around the southern tip of Africa for fear of
attack, avoid the region completely but add an additional 3,500 miles to their
shipping routes.43 Although the complex nature of international trade makes
the increased costs difficult to quantify, these costs have a negative impact
on the regional, if not global, economy.44 Of even greater concern is the
physical threat posed to those who travel through the region. Though the
pirates’ primary concerns are economic and not necessarily to harm or kill
civilians,45 pirates reportedly killed seven of the 569 crew members taken
hostage in 2011.46 Somali pirates also target and disrupt international relief
programs for the millions of people in war-torn Somalia.47
Several major factors contribute to the multifaceted and complex problem
of Somali piracy and are worth brief mention. First, Somalia’s proximity to
the Gulf of Aden, a crucial entry point for the Suez Canal, provides easy
access to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.48 Over 20,000 ships
carrying 12% of the world’s oil supply pass through the gulf annually,49
providing pirates with a wealth of potential targets. Second, a successful
pirate attack can earn millions of dollars for a crew of pirates50 and over
40

Kontorovich, supra note 11.
Ruth Wedgwood, The Law Adrift, AM. INT., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 123, 124.
42
Robert R. Frump, Danger at Sea, SHIPPING DIG., Jan. 12, 2009, at 6, 7.
43
Gilpin, supra note 8, at 12.
44
See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (noting piracy’s negative regional economic impact in the form of
declining revenues from tourism, foreign investment and shipping through the Suez Canal);
Wedgwood, supra note 41, at 123–24 (concluding that the substantial burden caused by piracy
upon the European and Israeli oil supply and the delivery of Chinese manufactured goods will
result in increased consumer prices in Europe, Israel, and the United States).
45
Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2008, at A6.
46
IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 8.
47
See Mike Mount et al., Pirates Attack U.S. Cargo Ship but Fail to Get Aboard, CNN (Apr.
14, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/14/somalia.pirates/index.html#cnnST
CText (reporting the attempted hijacking of the Liberty Sun, a ship bound for Mombasa, Kenya,
with food aid).
48
James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 25 WORLD
POL’Y J., Winter 2008/09, at 41, 41.
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Gagain, supra note 31, at 169 (citing the February 5, 2009 $3.2 million ransom
41
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$150,000 per pirate by one estimate.51 In a country where around seventy5% of households subsist on less than $2 per day, income of this magnitude
is extremely attractive.52 Moreover, local financiers and government
officials invest in the pirates’ ventures and reap windfall gains, helping to
entrench the pirate business model in the Somali economy.53 Finally, as a
failed state, Somalia’s central government has no judicial system or police
force, and simply lacks the authority to prevent this type of criminal
behavior.54 Despite several attempts, Somalia has failed to establish a
functioning federal government since the Siad Barre regime fell in 1991.55
The Transnational Federal Government (TFG) took power in 2003, but
remains largely ineffective.56 In fact, many TFG officials reportedly fund
and aid piratical activities themselves.57 This confluence of geographic,
economic, and political factors created the perfect environment for Somali
pirates, producing “perhaps the most significant eruption of such criminal
activity in nearly two hundred years.”58
B. The International Legal Framework
Piracy carries with it a unique set of challenges for the modern criminal
justice regime. What distinguishes pirates from other, similar criminals is
that pirates act on a supra-national level, without a true affiliation to any
state.59 Further, pirates usually operate on the “high seas,” the vast area
beginning twelve miles off the world’s coasts and belonging both “to all, and
to no one.”60 As the responsibility to police the high seas falls to no
particular nation, pirates fall through the cracks as they exploit an
international community based largely upon the existence of territorial

payment for the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter carrying tanks and small arms).
51
Kontorovich, supra note 11.
52
Gilpin, supra note 8, at 1.
53
Id. at 7 (estimating a financier with just twelve pirates could earn over $321,000 in yearly
profit).
54
Sterio, supra note 21, at 1454–55.
55
Gilpin, supra note 8, at 5.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 6.
58
Kontorovich, supra note 11.
59
Sterio, supra note 21, at 1460.
60
Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 43, 50 (2009).
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boundaries.61 The laws addressing piracy, therefore, attempt to address this
jurisdictional challenge.62
In response to this centuries-old challenge, the international community
developed the doctrine of universal jurisdiction,63 which justifies state
assertion of power over individuals in the broadest possible terms.64 Two
international treaties authorize countries to apprehend, prosecute, and
incarcerate pirates under domestic law.65 Excluding the modern limitation
discussed below, true universal jurisdiction grants this authority regardless of
the pirate’s nationality or where the crime was committed.66
At present, UNCLOS codifies the application of universal jurisdiction to
the crime of piracy.67 The first draft, signed into law in 1958, included eight
articles concerning piracy.68 The 1982 version of UNCLOS, which applies
today, also includes these articles.69 A number of nations, including the
United States, have not ratified UNCLOS.70 However, experts consider the
treaty a codification of customary international law and therefore binding on
all states, even non-parties to the convention.71
The piracy provisions are in Articles 100 through 107 of UNCLOS.72
Article 100 states the general requirement that all states must “cooperate to
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas.”73
Article 105 grants states the authority to apply universal jurisdiction in order
to carry out their Article 100 commitments.74 Article 101 contains the
definition of piracy. It reads:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

61

Sterio, supra note 21, at 1465–66 (noting how discrepancies in national laws often lead
to under-prosecution).
62
Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 251 (explaining that the international definition of piracy
codifies the concept of universal jurisdiction).
63
See Dutton, supra note 26, at 203 (noting piracy is the “oldest crime to which universal
jurisdiction applies”); Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 244 (arguing that for centuries piracy was
the only crime to which universal jurisdiction applied).
64
Dutton, supra note 26, at 203–04.
65
Id. at 204.
66
Id. at 203 n.21.
67
UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 101, 105.
68
Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More is Needed, 33
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 385 (2010).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Azubuike, supra note 60, at 49.
72
UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 100–107.
73
Id. art. 100.
74
Id. art. 105.
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).75
This definition triggers the universal jurisdiction provision in Article
105.76 Article 101 imposes three requirements for an act to be considered
piracy in accordance with international law.77 First, the act must be one
“committed for private ends.”78 This requirement is likely a relic of the days
when nations would employ pirates under letters of marque.79 UNCLOS
does not define the term “for private ends”80 and commentators differ as to
what it means.81 Somali pirates, however, seem to meet this criterion, as
they appear to be motivated only by the profits from ransom payments.82
The “private ends” requirement may become a greater issue if Somali pirate
regimes become affiliated with terrorist organizations that are ostensibly
motivated by public, social and political change rather than private financial
gain.83 Regardless, it is likely that clever defense attorneys will claim their

75

Id. art. 101.
Azubuike, supra note 60, at 54.
77
Id. at 51.
78
UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101.
79
Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 12 (2007).
80
Azubuike, supra note 60, at 52.
81
Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO
Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 690, 693 (2008) (explaining the
differences between a narrow interpretation of this requirement, which excludes politically
motivated violence at sea such as acts of terrorism, and a broad interpretation, which holds
that the term excludes only public acts of violence at sea, such as those committed by civil
war insurgents).
82
Guilfoyle, supra note 19, at 143 (noting that depicting themselves as purely after
financial gain is in the pirate’s best interest, as ransoms may not be payable to a terrorist or
other politically motivated organization).
83
U.N. SCOR, 65th Sess., 6390th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6390 (Sept. 27, 2010)
[hereinafter SCOR Report].
76
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clients acted for public or political ends, creating a further obstacle for the
application of UNCLOS’ definition to suspected pirates.84
The second requirement is the geographic limitation that piracy must take
place “on the high seas.”85 The geographic limitation in Article 101 applies
to both the definition of the offense (proscriptive jurisdiction) and the
parameters of a state’s enforcement authority (enforcement jurisdiction).86
According to UNCLOS, piracy can only be committed, and therefore
suppressed, outside of the realm of any other nation’s jurisdiction.87 This
requirement upholds notions of state sovereignty by allowing states to
monitor their own territorial waters without international interference.88 For
failed states such as Somalia, however, where authorities are either unable or
unwilling to police their own territorial seas, a crack develops in the
international regime to prevent piracy.89 As Somalia illustrates, a national
piracy problem can quickly become an international piracy problem.90
Finally, for an act of violence at sea to fall under the Article 101
definition of piracy, it must be committed by the passengers of one ship
“against another ship.”91 Suspected cases of piracy in the Gulf of Aden
usually meet this requirement, as the attacks involve two ships far offshore.92
Arguably, UNCLOS’s biggest drawback is that it neither requires nor
regulates state participation in the enforcement of its piracy provisions.93 It
merely provides a definition of piracy.94 Though Article 100 of UNCLOS
calls for states to “cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
piracy on the high seas,”95 no mechanism compels states to meet this duty.96
Even though UNCLOS represents international custom with regard to piracy,
states must first incorporate its provisions into their domestic criminal law to
successfully prosecute a pirate in their domestic judicial systems.97
84

Dutton, supra note 26, at 207–08.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101.
86
Guilfoyle, supra note 19, at 144.
87
Id.
88
Azubuike, supra note 60, at 51.
89
Id.
90
Sterio, supra note 21 (suggesting that Somali piracy has become a global problem).
91
UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101.
92
Dutton, supra note 26, at 207.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 100.
96
Dutton, supra note 26, at 206.
97
EUROPEAN SEC. & DEF. ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION,
REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING PIRACY, paras. 51–55, WEU Doc.
A/2037 (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION].
85
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However, few states have taken this crucial step since UNCLOS came into
force.98 Accordingly, piracy laws vary greatly between countries, creating a
confusing lack of cohesion that undermines Article 100’s mandate to repress
piracy.99 The specific problems that arise, and how they affect the criminal
justice process will be discussed in more detail in part III.
Some nations also rely on the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
Convention) to justify detention and prosecution of suspected pirates.100
Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention only binds member parties, as it is
not considered customary international law.101 The purpose of the SUA
Convention is to address the perceived gaps in UNCLOS.102 For example,
the SUA Convention covers politically motivated acts of violence against
ships, a crime not addressed by UNCLOS.103 Further, the SUA Convention
requires a state to either extradite or prosecute an offender, using stronger,
more specific language than UNCLOS.104 Despite these differences, most
nations remain reluctant to rely on the SUA Convention to justify detention
and prosecution of pirates.105 Some experts suggest that confusion regarding
the Convention’s applicability leads countries to believe the Convention is
only applicable to acts committed by terrorists.106 In other words, the SUA
Convention covers ship hijackings that are politically, not financially,
motivated.107
Finally, to combat the recent rise in Somali piracy the United Nations
issued a series of ad hoc measures in the form of Security Council
98
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authorities for the purpose of prosecution . . . .”), with UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 100
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Dutton, supra note 26, at 209 (finding only one instance in which the SUA Convention
was used).
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motivated” while “politically motivated acts of terrorism committed against ships and their
crew members on the high seas may not be included within the definition of piracy under
UNCLOS.”).
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resolutions.108 In June 2008, the Security Council called for states to
“cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and
prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off
the coast of Somalia.”109 The same resolution further authorized certain
nations that attained consent from the Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.”110 Resolution 1851, passed
unanimously in December of 2008, calls for increased international
coordination and even broader military action to fight piracy, authorizing
land-based operations in Somalia.111 Thus far, the international response to
these resolutions has been positive.112 The United States created an
international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which now
consists of over fifty member states and international organizations.113
Moreover, in December 2008, the European Union established operation
ATALANTA, an ongoing military operation designed to contribute to the
“deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
off the Somali coast.”114 These cooperative missions reduced the percentage
of successful pirate attacks in the region.115
III. PROBLEMS PROSECUTING PIRACY UNDER THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Despite the overwhelming amount of international attention and resources
aimed at fixing the Somali piracy problem, remarkably few pirates ever see
the inside of a courtroom.116 A recent empirical study performed by
respected international maritime law scholar Eugene Kontorovich found
“that of all clear cases of piracy punishable under universal jurisdiction,
international prosecution occurred in no more than 1.47 percent” of those
108
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cases.117 Further, as demonstrated by the Said case in the United States, the
difficulties continue even after suspects are brought to court.118 The very few
Somalis who are detained and prosecuted face a complex, disjointed legal
framework, where their rights and protections vary dramatically depending
on which country makes the arrest.119 This section explores the practical and
legal obstacles that contribute to these trends.
A. The Cost of Prosecuting Piracy
Perhaps the most obvious explanation as to why so many states are
reluctant to prosecute piracy revolves around economics.120 From a costbenefit perspective, prosecuting piracy is hard to justify on a national
level.121 First, a state faces the expense of policing the world’s oceans, a
costly venture in terms of both labor and equipment.122 Second, after
assuming this initial cost, states that capture suspected pirates must begin the
process of preparing for trial.123 This process usually entails collecting
evidence, transporting witnesses, and providing translation services.124 For
Western nations thousands of miles from the crime scene, these obstacles are
particularly expensive.125 Finally, prosecuting nations must be prepared to
incarcerate suspected pirates in domestic prisons.126 States are typically
reluctant to assume the weight of these enormous costs if they have no
compelling interest to do so.127 For example, a ship traveling the Gulf of
Aden may be registered under a Danish flag, owned by a British company,
insured by an American corporation, and staffed with a predominantly
Filipino crew, all while transporting Saudi oil.128 If attacked by Somali
pirates in international waters, the loss is spread between these state
117
Kontorovich & Art, supra note 14, at 436 (explaining that this low figure exists in spite
of the international surge following the 2008 Security Council resolutions).
118
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(4th Cir. 2012) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss piracy charges).
119
Sterio, supra note 21, at 1465–66.
120
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121
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122
Kontorovich & Art, supra note 14, at 449 (explaining that until the recent focus on
Somali piracy, no nation was willing to police the high seas for piracy).
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Dutton, supra note 26, at 219.
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Kraska & Wilson, supra note 48, at 45–46 (suggesting the daunting “expense and
logistical and legal burdens of transporting the pirates to a Western country for prosecution”
explains why so few Western countries are willing to prosecute).
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Dutton, supra note 26, at 219 (explaining the vast number of countries involved in
international trade, particularly in the Gulf of Aden).
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parties.129 Although several nations are victims of the pirate attack, no state
suffers compelling enough losses to take on the expensive task of
independently prosecuting pirates.130 Simply put, the costs associated with a
difficult international prosecution can sometimes outweigh the marginal loss
absorbed by each one of these separately affected nations.131 As the
international legal framework provides neither a rule of priority nor a rule of
obligation between these nations, which country shoulders the burden of
prosecution is often a “political, not a legal issue.”132
Consequently, Western nations are often reluctant to carry the heavy
burden of prosecution absent compelling national motives.133 The chief
prosecutor in Hamburg, Germany, recently stated, “the German judicial
system cannot, and should not, act as World Police. Active prosecution
measures will only be initiated if the German State has a particular, welldefined interest . . . .”134 Similarly, in May 2009, Spain released seven
suspected Somali pirates because officials believed the crime had too little
relation to Spain to warrant prosecution.135 Even states that are direct
victims of an attack often seek to avoid the expensive burden of prosecuting
pirates, as demonstrated by the common practice of simply paying a ransom
in return for hijacked ships, cargo, and crew.136 From the perspective of
Western nations currently policing the Gulf of Aden, it is far more costeffective to simply release suspected pirates on the beaches of Somalia than
to make an arrest.137 Any effective change in the legal framework of piracy,
therefore, must address the costs that accompany piracy prosecutions.
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B. Confusion over a Pirate’s Legal Status
Historically, a pirate’s legal status was somewhere between combatant
and criminal, carrying the “disabilities of both” but the “privileges and
immunities” of neither.138 Countries could capture pirates and prosecute
them, although they could not do the same to regular combatants.139
Alternatively, countries could attack and kill pirates without a trial, whereas
they would have to provide a trial to a criminal.140 For better or worse,
modern nations no longer have the same choices.141 As Eugene Kontorovich
notes, the advent and development of human rights law now “precludes the
classic and most obvious antipiracy measure: killing them.”142 Moreover,
UNCLOS requires pirates to be prosecuted under a nation’s civilian criminal
justice system, as opposed to a specialized judicial body.143
Beyond merely prohibiting the killing of pirates without a trial, the
modern body of international humanitarian law presents obstacles that
further dissuade countries from prosecuting acts of piracy.144 Perhaps chief
among these concerns is whether a detained Somali pirate can be classified
as a refugee, and therefore privileged to asylum under a number of human
rights conventions.145 Asylum may be required if a pirate shows he would
face an unfair trial, torture, or extrajudicial killing if repatriated to Somalia, a
predominantly lawless nation lacking a strong federal government.146 In
responding to Somali piracy, Britain encouraged its ships not to arrest pirates
for fear of this exact possibility.147 Britain’s concern is that, if successful in
claiming refugee status under European Union human rights law, a Somali
pirate may be authorized to stay in Britain indefinitely.148 As Britain
apparently realized, this possibility increases the cost of arresting pirates,
while providing a reward to the pirates themselves.149 For the captured
138
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pirate, remaining in a Western nation, such as Britain, could be viewed as a
reward.150 Britain, however, would be stuck with the question of what to do
with the refuge pirates.151
Another concern stemming from an ambiguous legal status is whether
pirates classify as enemy combatants, and therefore deserve prisoner of war
(POW) status under the Third Geneva Convention.152 Though the treaty was
designed with large, well-organized armies in mind, pirates may be able to
successfully claim POW status under Article 4(a)(2) of the convention,
which recognizes “other militias,” “volunteer corps,” and “organized
resistance movements” as enemy combatants provided they meet certain
conditions.153 If entitled to POW status under Article 4(a)(2), pirates would
enjoy Geneva Convention protections until their final repatriation154 at the
termination of the armed conflict, an occurrence that could be difficult to
define in the case of Somali piracy.155 While a pirate’s status as a POW
would not prevent prosecution under municipal law, Article 4(a)(2)
articulates a specific set of rules affecting his treatment by the detaining
power156 and would invite international input into the domestic procedure.157
These added burdens could delay prosecution and increase the costs of
detention, further deterring states from apprehending the pirates at all.158
Although scholars disagree over the applicability of the Third Geneva
Convention to Somali piracy159 and no nation currently recognizes Somali
150
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piracy as an “organized resistance movement,”160 the ambiguity surrounding
a pirate’s POW status presents another potentially expensive legal question
for capturing states.161 In situations of uncertainty, Article 5 stipulates that a
person shall enjoy POW status “until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.”162 At the very least, therefore, a pirate
may be entitled to a hearing in front of a competent tribunal regardless of
whether he perfectly fits into one of the Third Geneva Convention’s
categories.163 If a captured pirate invokes this right and thus halts civilian
criminal proceedings, the prosecuting state will incur further drains on
judicial resources as it litigates this question.164
A pirate’s ambiguous legal status presents a controversial political
question as well. After declaring that Article 4(a)(2) did not apply to al
Qaeda, the second Bush Administration faced severe international
criticism.165 Arguably, Somali pirates meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements
even better than al Qaeda, as the pirates treat captured crew reasonably,
thereby satisfying Article 4(a)(2)’s requirement that the militia abide by the
laws and customs of war.166 In fear of international backlash, therefore,
nations may be reluctant to declare Somali pirates beyond the scope of the
Third Geneva Convention.167
Further confusing the matter, a suspected Somali pirate’s ambiguous legal
status poses yet another complicated question: what rights should a captured
pirate have?168 Even those who argue that pirates are “not enemy prisoners
of war” acknowledge that they should receive some “Geneva Conventions
treatment” while remaining eligible for domestic, civilian prosecution.169
Under the international legal framework, however, states often have different
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answers to this question, assuming they have answered it at all.170 If not
protected by the Third Geneva Convention, for example, pirates arrested by
the United States may not even have basic criminal protections against illegal
searches and seizures, warrantless arrests, and indefinite detentions.171 In
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court of the United States
found no indication that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment “to
apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign
territory or in international waters.”172 Accordingly, in January 2006, the
United States detained ten suspected Somali pirates for eight days without
probable cause determinations, charges, or a trial,173 long past the forty-eight
hour limit required for arrests without a warrant.174
Similar procedural complications exist for other countries involved in the
fight against Somali piracy. For parties to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 5(3) ensures a right to a prompt hearing in
front of a judicial authority.175 While the ECHR jurisprudence on this
Article indicates that materially unavoidable delays do not violate the
convention, states must comply with a complex set of legal requirements to
justify detaining and prosecuting a suspected criminal.176 Notably, both the
European Union and NATO, two of the international organizations that
command and coordinate anti-piracy operations, are not parties to the
ECHR.177 Thus, if an ECHR signatory captures a pirate while under the
command and strategic control of these international bodies, the ECHR may
not apply.178 In this event, prosecuting nations must rely on other sources,
such as international custom or domestic criminal process to determine how
to treat detainees.179
Ultimately, this international confusion marginalizes the rights of
suspected Somali pirates. If a country is not dissuaded from arresting a
170
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applications of various human rights treaties in relation to the treatment of a captured pirate).
171
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suspected pirate altogether, the suspected pirate faces a murky and disjointed
set of procedural protections after capture, which vary depending on the
arresting nation or organization.180 Even those countries making the arrests
are unsure exactly what protections should be granted to their detainees.181
Further, with little or no conception of modern criminal justice, suspected
pirates usually fail to understand even the most basic procedural
protections.182
Any legitimate and effective reform of the regime to fight and prosecute
piracy must therefore include a comprehensive definition of a pirate’s legal
status and criminal rights. In May 2009, for example, the Russian Navy held
twenty-nine suspected pirates aboard one of its warships for three weeks
while determining whether to prosecute.183 A clearly articulated legal status
would be advantageous to both the pirate and the arresting state. A concrete
definition would help prevent excessively long detention periods and
mitigate apprehensions on whether to prosecute for arresting nations.
C. The Intersection of Domestic and International Law
As discussed above, UNCLOS provides states with broad international
authority to capture and prosecute pirates.184 A pirate’s arrest and
prosecution, however, must also be carried out in accordance with the
arresting state’s domestic laws.185 The resulting relationship between
national and international law is not always seamless.186
Since UNCLOS came into existence, few states have incorporated its full
effect into their domestic criminal statutes.187 Many nations, for example,
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have no law against maritime piracy at all.188 Where nations do outlaw
maritime piracy, the statutes are not uniform and contain limitations not
included in UNCLOS.189 Rather than codify true universal jurisdiction, for
instance, some nations criminalize piracy only when a sufficient connection
exists between the arresting state and the crime,190 such as an attack on
nationals191 or an attack perpetrated within territorial waters.192 Moreover,
domestic laws rarely define acts of piracy as broadly as international law,
excluding preparatory acts such as incitement, support, or voluntary
participation, which are included in UNCLOS.193 As many domestic laws
are not coextensive with UNCLOS, circumstances often arise where a nation
may have the international jurisdiction to prosecute yet lack the domestic
authority to do so.194
Further complicating the matter, some states have not taken the basic
steps necessary to implement their UNCLOS responsibilities. Implicit in the
international framework is the notion that states will arrest suspected
pirates.195 However, some countries, such as Germany, refuse to grant their
navies the authority to make criminal arrests.196 In the Gulf of Aden, where
military ships are engaged in massive patrolling efforts, this type of domestic
law leaves Germany incapable of arresting and fully repressing piracy
according to its UNCLOS responsibilities.197 These discrepancies between
international and national law help explain why so few states prosecute
Somali piracy.198 Without domestic authority, any grant of international
188
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jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute suspected piracy, no matter how broad, is
essentially a dead letter.
D. Evidentiary Issues
One of the most basic impediments to achieving successful prosecution is
finding and presenting evidence sufficient to convict a suspected pirate.199
Once captured, pirates often profess to be innocent fishermen, a plausible
claim considering many pirates are fishermen by trade.200 Further, the
possession of weapons does not distinguish pirates from innocent seafarers in
the region who also frequently carry weapons.201 To convict a pirate,
therefore, prosecutors must present persuasive evidence beyond merely
where a suspect was found and what weapons he carried. However, this can
be a difficult task considering the nature of the alleged offense.202 Pirate
attacks often occur 1,000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia.203 If the
pirates do not throw any incriminating evidence into the sea when a naval
ship approaches,204 the military personnel making the arrest are usually
untrained in preserving and collecting evidence and do not always follow
proper procedure required by civilian courts.205 Therefore, gathering and
transporting the defendants, witnesses, weapons, and other evidence
necessary for a judicial procedure is often prohibitively difficult.206
This problem presents yet another dilemma. On the one hand, the
difficulty of meeting evidentiary burdens dissuades countries from
prosecuting pirates.207 Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner, Commander
of the Seventh Coast Guard District, recently suggested that one of the main
deterrents to states is the “significant legal and logistical challenges” in
transporting pirates, evidence and witnesses to appear in criminal courts
thousands of miles away.208 Returning to the historical summary justice
convenience, then the legal regime as codified in UNCLOS is of little use.”).
199
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approach to piracy, however, is simply no longer a feasible option.209 Pirates
must receive a set of basic evidentiary and due process protections.210 Any
solution to piracy must therefore walk the fine line between these competing
interests, reducing the evidentiary burden to prosecute and convict a pirate
while maintaining basic criminal rights.
IV. SOLUTIONS
This global failure to prosecute piracy calls attention to a systematic
problem. The chosen means of enforcing the law matches neither the nature
of the crime nor the criminal who commits it. Certainly, a legal system is
broken when it effectively deters states from enforcing the law and
simultaneously rewards criminals that break it. States seem to be adapting,
however, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to stretch the legal
framework. Though encouraging, current state practice is ultimately
insufficient. Further steps are necessary to install a successful anti-piracy
regime.
A. Current State Practice
Despite the setbacks described above, nations throughout the world
recently increased their efforts to prosecute Somali piracy.211 Currently,
piracy trials occur in one of three ways. Usually, pirates apprehended by
Western nations are transferred to a regional state, such as Kenya, for
prosecution.212 Alternatively, in 2010, Western nations such as the United
States, the Netherlands, and France, commenced domestic piracy trials.213
Finally, the TFG and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
recently began efforts to prosecute pirates in the Puntland and Somaliland
regions of Somalia.214 Though encouraging, these approaches do not alone
provide a sustainable and complete solution to the Somali piracy problem.215
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Transferring suspected pirates to a regional state, usually Kenya, remains
the most common practice for prosecuting Somali pirates under the theory of
universal jurisdiction.216 Indeed, between 1998 and 2009 over 76% of
universal jurisdiction piracy trials occurred in Kenya, “all but four of
them.”217 For nations struggling to justify the financial, political, and legal
risks of prosecuting pirates at home, Kenyan courts offer a convenient
solution.218
In 2008 and 2009, Kenya signed a Memorandum of
Understandings (MOUs) with the United States, and similar agreements with
Britain, the European Union, Denmark, Canada, and China, agreeing to
prosecute suspected pirates in exchange for financial support.219 Pursuant to
these agreements, Kenya tried at least ten pirates of the more than 100
alleged pirates the country was host to.220
Despite preliminary success, this arrangement has placed a significant
burden on Kenya’s already overburdened criminal justice systems.221 Kenya
has a 870,000 case backlog, with only three prosecutors in the Mombasa
office of the Department of Public Prosecutors.222 Further, Kenya currently
incarcerates around 53,000 prisoners, despite a national capacity to
incarcerate of only 16,000.223 As a result of this overburdened criminal
justice system, reports accuse Kenya of holding suspected pirates for months
without trial or access to adequate healthcare.224 Reports also indicate that
the Kenyan government “does not provide [pirates] with defense attorneys”
in certain situations.225 If true, these conditions violate many of the basic
protections guaranteed by the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights.226 Convention violations aside, in September 2010 the weight of the
world’s piracy problem became too much for Kenya to bear.227 Facing a
216
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staggering lack of judicial resources, Kenya canceled the MOUs despite
significant pressure from the international community.228 Thus capturing
nations may no longer rely on Kenya as a forum for prosecuting Somali
pirates.
During 2010, perhaps the most encouraging development yet occurred in
the fight against Somali piracy. Several Western nations using the power of
universal jurisdiction began piracy trials in their own domestic courts.229 To
date, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany and France have even
convicted Somali pirates.230 While this unprecedented willingness to
prosecute pirates suggests progress, a reminder of the infrequency of these
domestic prosecutions must accompany any discussion of this trend.
Although over thirty nations deploy ships to the Somali region,231 only a
handful of these countries attempted a domestic prosecution.232 In the rare
instance an apprehending nation does try a pirate in their domestic court
rather than simply letting the pirate go or outsource prosecution to a regional
country, obstacles inherent in the legal framework make prosecution legally
difficult, controversial, and “potentially embarrassing for the forum state.”233
For several reasons, these domestic prosecutions do not appear to be an
ultimate solution.
First, some question whether detention and conviction in a Western
nation actually deters the pirates.234 One suspected (now convicted) pirate
held in the Netherlands reportedly enjoyed “the comfort of a TV and a toilet
in his cell,” novel amenities to a Somali pirate.235 The pirate preferred the
relative luxury and safety of imprisonment in the Netherlands to his life in
Somalia and planned to have his family join him after serving his
228
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sentence.236 Holding pirates in Western prisons, therefore, may inadvertently
reward rather than punish their piratical conduct.237
Second, for Western, democratic nations, the decision to prosecute
Somali pirates is often political rather than legal. For example, many Dutch
politicians have argued against further piracy prosecutions, fearing an
expensive and unpopular legal battle over repatriation of the Somali
nationals.238
If citizens consider such prosecutions expensive or
controversial, democratic nations may be less likely to prosecute Somali
pirates on the level necessary to eradicate the problem.
Third, these domestic prosecutions present basic legal difficulties as
domestic judges strive to interpret and apply international law.239 Many
states outlaw piracy according to “the law of nations,” apparently
incorporating the international definition of piracy into domestic criminal
law.240 Criminal prosecution under such language, however, can be
difficult.241 The U.S. piracy statute provides an example. Originally enacted
in 1819, this statute does not specifically identify what constitutes “piracy as
defined by the law of nations.”242 Rather, the statute leaves it to the court to
surmise the international definition of piracy and apply it, a task that
domestic judges may be ill-suited to perform without expertise in the field of
international law.243
Confusion surrounding the application of this statute led to an interesting
legal conflict in the United States. In the summer of 2010, two Somali
piracy cases began before different judges in the Federal Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, situated in Norfolk.244 In August 2010, Judge
Raymond A. Jackson dismissed the piracy charges in the first case.245 Judge
Jackson held that the United States piracy statute must be limited to the
definition of piracy at the time of the law’s enactment.246 Citing the statute’s
only judicial interpretation, an 1820 Supreme Court decision by Justice
236
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Joseph Story, Judge Jackson found that an attack must be successful to
constitute piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.247 Since the attack in question was
unsuccessful, the men could not be held liable for piracy under U.S. law.248
Jackson received strong criticism from the international legal community
for refusing to adopt the modern UNCLOS definition of piracy.249 Citing the
“fair warning requirement,” which bars punishment for conduct a defendant
“could not reasonably understand to be proscribed,”250 Jackson defined
piracy according to the statute’s original 1819 interpretation.251 Scholars
contend, however, that this approach demonstrates a “deep hesitancy to
weave the ephemeral strands of customary international law — state practice,
international organization pronouncements, professorial writings — into
something as solid as handcuffs.”252 Judge Jackson gives only secondary
weight to two widely ratified treaties that contain modern definitions of
piracy, including the 1958 High Seas Convention that the Senate ratified.253
Less than three months later, Virginia Judge Mark S. Davis took a
different approach. The case in front of Judge Davis involved an
unsuccessful piracy attempt on the frigate USS Nicholas.254 In defining
piracy, Davis turned to Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, in which the Supreme
Court confirmed federal judicial authority to “recognize (but not create) new
causes of action based on the ‘present day law of nations.’ ”255 Thus,
whereas Judge Jackson applied the static law of 1819, Davis decided that the
“ ‘law of nations’ connotes a changing body of law, and that the definition of
piracy in 18 U.S.C. § 1651 must therefore be assessed according to the
international consensus of the definition at the time of the alleged
247
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offense.”256 Judge Davis found such consensus in the 1982 UNCLOS
definition, which includes attempted piracy.257 Unlike the Said case, the
unsuccessful attack on the USS Nicholas could therefore proceed to trial.258
This example illustrates how administering international law on a
domestic scale can produce incongruous results. That two judges in the same
country, let alone the same courthouse, may reach opposite conclusions
reveals the difficulty of interpreting and applying international anti-piracy
laws on a domestic level. As courts around the world take on this difficult
task, wildly different results could occur as states apply various doctrines of
statutory and constitutional interpretation.259 Accordingly, discrepancies in
enforcement will likely persist, further frustrating international attempts to
uniformly deter piracy through domestic prosecution.
Finally, the most recent development in the fight against Somali piracy
involves prosecutions in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia.260
With the help of various United Nations programs and other regional
partners, Somalia has arrested and convicted a number of pirates within its
own boarders.261 Though encouraging, reports indicate these prosecutions
require “significant further assistance” to meet “international standards.”262
Necessary funding for this project, however, has been difficult to secure.263
Donors lack confidence due to the “fractured nature of the law on piracy
within Somalia” and the “issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial
capacity.”264 Without adequate funding or judicial resources, Somalia is not
an immediate or sustainable venue for piracy prosecutions.
Ultimately, deterring Somali piracy using the current legal framework
presents an insurmountable challenge for the international community.265
Even after the substantial efforts to prosecute pirates both in Western and
regional nations, studies show no impact on the rate of pirate attacks.266 In
November 2010, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn
Pascoe reported that “[t]he menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia was
256
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outpacing international efforts to stem it.”267 As this statement seems to
acknowledge, recent efforts to deter Somali piracy have fallen short of
providing the urgent, sustainable, and effective solution necessary for its
eradication.268 Hampered by inherent financial, logistical, and legal
problems, the current legal framework should be replaced.
B. Navigating a Way Forward
To escape the current legal quagmire, nations must address this
international problem on an international level. To that end, advocates of a
global solution propose including piracy in a new or currently existing
international tribunal.269 Immediate implementation of such a solution,
though, seems unlikely.270 In a July 2010 report, the United Nations found
including piracy within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or
the International Tribunal on the Laws of the Sea not to be “feasible.”271
Hope for an international solution, however, need not be lost. Instead, the
United Nations should establish a temporary, regional piracy tribunal under
its Chapter VII authority. This approach would provide immediate relief and
create momentum toward a more permanent solution.
Historically, the Security Council uses ad hoc criminal tribunals to
address unique problems with the administration of criminal justice.272 Of
course, the Security Council may only exercise Chapter VII authority in the
event of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”273
Once this threshold is met, the Security Council may take certain measures to
“restore international peace and security,” including the establishment of an
ad hoc criminal tribunal.274 The situation here appears to meet this
267
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preliminary requirement,275 as existing Security Council resolutions find
Somalia to constitute such a threat and piracy to exacerbate the problem.276
The Security Council, in other words, seems to possess the necessary
authority to immediately create such an ad hoc tribunal.
Equipped with the proper authority, the Security Council could begin the
actual process of creating a piracy tribunal. In May 1993, the Security
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) by passing resolution 827.277 This resolution approved
the ICTY’s constitutive statute and addressed several logistical matters, such
as location, competence, and organization.278 Creation of the piracy tribunal
would likely occur in much the same way, with a draft statute addressing
these logistical matters presented to the Security Council for a vote.
Perhaps the greatest logistical question surrounding the proposed piracy
tribunal involves its location. For several reasons, the most advantageous
location for the piracy tribunal is within or near Somali territory. Proximity
to Somalia and the Gulf of Aden would ease efforts to transfer apprehended
suspects, collect evidence, and sequester witnesses in preparation for trial.279
Apprehending nations would no longer suffer the burden of conducting trial
in a courtroom several thousand miles from the scene of the crime, and
defendants would no longer be hauled across the globe, away from their
families, to stand trial. An ad hoc criminal tribunal in the region would also
eliminate concerns regarding a pirate’s legal status, as countries would not
bear the risk of captured pirates claiming combatant or refugee privileges.
Further, the presence of an international judicial body within Somalia will
help the TFG rebuild their broken and ineffective criminal justice system.280
One of the great accomplishments of the ICTY was to strengthen the rule and
power of law within a war-torn Yugoslavia.281 To this end, the international
piracy tribunal will provide jobs for citizens and resources for lawmakers and
jurists.282 A functioning judiciary could also engender societal respect for
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“[T]he establishment of the International Tribunal falls squarely
within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41.”).
275
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the law, demonstrating to criminals the legal consequences of their actions.283
Placing the piracy tribunal in Somalia, therefore, serves two strategic ends—
an effective and immediate stride to eradicate piracy, and much needed
international support for the Somali government.
Also in this initial stage, the jurisdictional competency of the piracy
tribunal must be considered. To define what acts the tribunal may punish,
the Security Council should start by adopting the definition of piracy
codified in UNCLOS article 101.284 This article, however, pertains only to
attacks on the high seas.285 Therefore, to create the most effective tribunal
possible, the Security Council must expand the body’s jurisdiction beyond
the substantive and geographic limitations of UNCLOS. For example, the
tribunal should have jurisdiction over the organization and financing of
piracy. With jurisdiction over these activities, the tribunal could reach the
financiers behind Somali piracy and substantially disrupt their business
model. To that same end, the tribunal should extend jurisdiction to cover
acts occurring within Somali territory. With this authority, the piracy
tribunal could prosecute all participants of piracy, no matter where they seek
refuge.
The Security Council must also address the related issue of concurrent
jurisdiction. Pursuant to UNCLOS, all nations have authority to prosecute
the pirates they capture on the high seas.286 If a piracy tribunal is created,
both the tribunal and the apprehending nation could conceivably claim
jurisdiction over the same captured Somali pirate. The Security Council
must therefore create a mechanism for determining which entity has primacy.
In these circumstances, nations should retain the authority to prosecute
suspected pirates only when they are given the consent of the piracy tribunal.
Further, the tribunal should grant consent if a state demonstrates a
compelling interest to try the pirate in domestic court. Such compelling
interests should be decided by the court on a case-by-case basis, with
decisions subject to review by the Security Council. Giving priority to the
piracy tribunal encourages nations to take advantage of the tribunal. In turn,
regular use could help ensure steady financial support from the international
community. This system is also flexible, providing states a conditional
www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/EmploymentandInternships (last visited Apr. 28, 2012)
(noting that the ICTY employs around 900 staff members); Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY –
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in Yugoslavia).
283
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284
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ability to domestically prosecute suspected pirates in special circumstances.
Moreover, such a strategy ensures that the majority of captured pirates face
the same internationally regulated and monitored judicial and detention
system.
During this planning stage, the Security Council must also determine
exactly how to structure the judicial body. The piracy tribunal should consist
of at least two separate judicial bodies; a trial court and an appellate court.
The tribunal would also require a prosecutor’s office. To ensure judicial
competency, these bodies should be staffed with judges and lawyers who are
highly specialized in matters of international maritime law. The judges
should be nominated and then elected by the members of the General
Assembly. This process would ensure that all nations have an input, as all
nations are in some way affected by the crime of piracy. Prosecuting
attorneys, however, should be appointed by the Security Council. This
separate process for selecting and appointing judges and lawyers would help
maintain an independent bench.
Moreover, exclusive control over
prosecutors would allow the Security Council to retain a degree of input over
how aggressively suspected pirates are prosecuted.
Requiring the
prosecutor’s office to submit an annual report for the Security Council’s
review could further enhance this control. Finally, the Security Council may
also wish to establish some type of legal aid office for defendants who
cannot afford legal representation. Most importantly, these positions should
be heavily weighted with individuals from the region. Preference for East
African judges and counselors would create a tribunal familiar with the area
and sympathetic to its unique problems.
Notably, the ad hoc piracy tribunal must be temporary, as Chapter VII
powers may be invoked only to “maintain or restore international peace.”287
Accordingly, the tribunal would eventually require a completion and residual
strategy.288 As demonstrated by precedent, however, a detailed strategy
might not be a prerequisite to bringing the piracy tribunal to life.289 When
establishing the ICTY in 1993, the Security Council stipulated no exact
completion date or strategy.290 Ten years later, the tribunal’s judges
compiled a plan to complete their work, which was later endorsed by
287
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Security Council resolutions.291 Taking a similar stance with regard to the
piracy tribunal would allow the Security Council to consider many different
influences and contingencies for ending the piracy tribunal, a topic that is
beyond the scope of this Note.
Those who oppose the creation of a piracy tribunal often cite the
anticipated cost of such a body as support for their argument.292 Indeed, a
new judicial mechanism would require substantial resources such as new
facilities, judges, lawyers, and other staff.293 Even the United Nations
recognizes an ad hoc tribunal as an expensive option, noting that other
judicial mechanisms “have ranged from around $14.3 million (the East
Timor Special Panels for a biennium) to $376.2 million (ICTY for a
biennium).”294
However, certain unique characteristics of the piracy problem could help
facilitate financing for the tribunal. First, piracy burdens maritime security
on a global scale, and not just for those nations located within the Somali
region. A piracy tribunal, therefore, benefits all nations, distinguishing it
from other ad hoc tribunals that provide judicial relief only to specific
geographic areas. This fact could lead to reliable financial participation
because nations will expect to directly profit from their investment in the
form of maritime security. Second, under the current system nations that
choose to prosecute Somali pirates must shoulder the entire cost alone.
Thus, while costly to the United Nations as a collective entity, an ad hoc
tribunal would be cost-efficient to each of its separate members, who would
share the cost equitably. The collective result, reliable piracy deterrence,
would be far greater than the individual cost to any one nation. Finally, the
Security Council could also solicit funding from the shipping industry. As
the group most directly victimized by piracy, shipping companies could be
willing to contribute to the costs of prosecuting and imprisoning those
responsible. As these factors indicate, the tribunal’s cost could be spread
amongst a number of international entities, producing a more efficient and
effective means of piracy deterrence than the current system.
Finally, implementation of an ad hoc piracy tribunal would have
important consequences for the future of piracy law. The current statecentered legal framework relies on mutual participation, cooperation, and
coordination by all states to suppress maritime piracy. Like a chain that is
only as strong as its weakest link, however, the system unravels when a
failed state such as Somalia has neither the resources nor the will to prevent
291
292
293
294
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Id.
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pirates from seeking refuge within its territory.
Despite massive
international attention, for example, piracy reached record levels in 2010 for
the fourth straight year.295 To say the least, the current legal framework is
broken.
An ad hoc piracy tribunal, however, could be an important first step
toward fixing the framework. The temporary criminal courts in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia, for instance, played crucial roles in catalyzing support for the
International Criminal Court.296 A temporary piracy tribunal could have a
similar effect on the international community, exposing both the positive and
negative aspects of an international forum for trying suspected pirates.
Further, a temporary piracy tribunal under the Security Council will allow
for a degree of judicial experimentation. Noting the evidentiary difficulties
of proving “that armed men in a boat on the high seas are pirates,” Eugene
Kontorovich recently suggested adopting “equipment articles” that “create a
judicial presumption of guilt on piracy charges for the crews of civilian
vessels possessing certain specified equipment within a certain defined area
of the high seas.”297 Though the merits of such a strategy are debatable, a
piracy tribunal provides the United Nations with the latitude to develop these
types of creative approaches.
To remedy this situation, the Security Council should chart a new legal
course for combating Somali pirates and convene an ad hoc criminal
tribunal. This action could finally restore peace to the Gulf of Aden and
prevent the number of pirate attacks from increasing yet again in 2012.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite pouring unprecedented amounts of global attention and resources
into the Gulf of Aden, pirates continue to defy their captors by increasing the
frequency and range of their attacks. With minimal resources and training,
these modern buccaneers disrupt global shipping lanes, block international
aid deliveries, and frustrate the world’s foremost naval powers. The
international community can no longer afford to watch the shipping industry
suffer while money is funneled into the lawless society of Somalia, possibly
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even filling the pockets of terrorists. Piracy is a global menace that must be
stopped with strong and effective legal action.
As it stands today, however, the international community confronts
Somali piracy with a broken system. The regime, predicated on universal
jurisdiction, gives authority to those states willing to prosecute but leaves the
decisions of whether and how to prosecute entirely to the apprehending
nation.
This structure ignores the unique nature of piracy, which
distinguishes it from other international crimes. Pirates are supra-national
actors with nebulous legal standing that injure the entire global community,
rather than individual national actors. Accordingly, prosecution is legally
complex and expensive. Transporting evidence and witnesses to a courtroom
thousands of miles away can be financially and logistically impossible.
Absent strong compulsion, therefore, nations typically elect not to shoulder
the entire legal, fiscal, and political cost of trying a Somali pirate in a court
of law.
Despite the inadequacy of the current system, encouraging signs of
change have begun to emerge over the past few years. Regional countries
and apprehending nations have shown a growing interest in bringing pirates
to justice and deterring piratical activity. Looking beyond the auspicious
beginnings of domestic prosecution, however, the eventual limitations of
domestic piracy trials are clear. Prosecutions in Kenya and other regional
nations raise potential legal and humanitarian problems, as apprehending
nations transfer suspected pirates to countries without the legal or judicial
capacity to handle the criminals. Meanwhile, trials in Western nations may
lack a true deterrent quality under the circumstances. Further, African and
Western nations alike must confront a confusing integration of domestic and
international law.
To fix the Somali piracy problem, the international community must
abandon this limited, state-centric approach. While a long-term solution may
be the establishment of some type of permanent international tribunal, an ad
hoc judicial mechanism could prove to be the perfect short-term option.
Given a flexible, immediate option, the Security Council could reduce the
Somali piracy problem now and begin to restore order to one of the world’s
most important shipping lanes.

